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INTRODUCTION 
The sources and methods of espionage, the goals and tactics of covert action. 
and the professional conduct of intelligence officers are matters typically hidden 
from public scrutiny, yet clearly worthy of public debate and philosophical 
attention. Recent academic studies of intelligence that have had any intentional 
bearing on ethics or political philosophy have largely focused on procedural 
questions surrounding the proper degree of oversight of intelligence agencies. But 
what is often missed in such examinations is substantive ethical analysis of 
intelligence operations themselves. 
This gap in the literature may be due in part to the lingering influence of the 
idea that ethical principles are not appropriate to apply to "statecraft" or 
international politics, as if doing so one makes a kind of "category mistake." But 
an amoralist view of international relations clearly cannot be sustained. Whatever 
interests or rights that states can legitimately be said to have must derive from the 
interests and rights of their individual citizens. War waged in defense of the nation 
can be morally justified in ways analogous to and derivative of individuals' rights 
to resist an assault on their family. And because individuals have no right to murder 
and steal from their neighbors, there can be no morally sound raison d'etat for 
waging aggressive war. The proper question, then, is not whether ethical principles 
apply to statecraft, but rather how they should be validly applied to statecraft. 
Most of us recognize certain basic moral rules to be binding in most cases: 
tell the truth; keep your promises; care for your family; avoid harming others; 
respect the rights of others; and so on. Rules like these cannot be ignored even when 
 they prove to be personally inconvenient. But most of us would also agree that there 
can be legitimate exceptions to otherwise valid moral rules. Sometimes, for 
example, we may be forced to choose between two or more important moral 
principles when they can't all be fulfilled at the same time. Occasionally, we even 
face truly tragic decisions, where each of the available options will result in serious 
harm and we must therefore choose the lesser of evils. Morally right actions don't 
always produce outcomes that are good without qualification.2
Moral conflict can arise in professional life as well as in private life. 
Professional roles sometimes involve special obligations which can outweigh other 
important ethical considerations. Investigative journalists may be permitted to 
misrepresent their identity in order to gain the confidence of a government official 
they suspect of corruption. Or defense lawyers may be expected to try to undermine 
the credibility of a prosecution witness in cross-examination even if they know the 
witness is telling the truth about the defendant. 
Some of the virtues required for intelligence work, such as discretion, loyalty 
and tenacity, are also instrumental to professions like diplomacy, the military, law, 
business and journalism.3 But many of the skills and character traits drawn upon and 
reinforced by the profession of intelligence are very different from those expected 
of the average citizen or other professionals. 
The CIA was created by an act of Congress in 1947, and authorized by the 
National Security Council the following year to undertake '"special projects" (i.e., 
covert action)/ An impassioned report to President Eisenhower in 1954 argued 
that the US faced "'an implacable enemy [i.e., international communism] whose 
avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost," 
and urged the US to "'learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy [its] enemies by more 
clever" and "more ruthless" methods than those of its opponents. The report 
conceded that this entailed a "fundamentally repugnant philosophy" and contra-
dicted "long-standing American concepts of 'fair play,'" but it insisted that such 
an approach was necessary given the grave international situation that existed.5 
More recent advocates of strong US espionage and covert action programs have 
typically focused on the strategies and methods they deem essential to meeting 
various foreign threats,6 from the KGB to contemporary drug lords and terrorist 
organizations.7
I do not question the "just cause" underlying the creation of the CIA in the 
late 1940s, nor do I think that its legitimacy is up for grabs in the wake of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. If the CIA did not already exist, it would be necessary to invent 
it. Furthermore, the fact that the CIA is a lawfully authorized arm of a liberal 
democracy lends it a legitimacy — a "social contract," if you will — which could 
never be ascribed to the KGB, for example. Dismantling the CIA, as some in 
Congress have recently proposed, would endanger US national security. Even as 
persistent a critic of government secrecy as Sissela Bok nonetheless grants that 
deception can occasionally be justified in national defense: "Honesty ought not to 
allow the creation of an emergency by the enemy, when deception can forestall or 
 avert it — Whenever it is right to resist an assault or a threat by force, it must then 
be allowable to do so by guile."8
In some essays written by former CIA officers, it has been suggested that 
the peculiar nature of the knowledge and expertise of intelligence professionals 
relative to grave external threats requires an extraordinary or specialized 
morality.9 In other words, like politicians who "get their hands dirty" in the 
public interest, the role of intelligence officers is thought by some to warrant 
excusing them in that capacity from certain ordinary moral constraints. As 
Arthur Hulnick and Daniel Mattausch wrote: 
Professional standards require intelligence professionals to lie, hide 
information, or use covert tactics to protect their 'cover,' access, 
sources, and responsibilities. The Central Intelligence Agency ex-
pects, teaches, encourages, and controls these tactics so that the lies 
are consistent and supported ('backstopped'). The CIA expects 
intelligence officers to teach others to lie, deceive, steal, launder 
money, and perform a variety of other activities that would certainly 
be illegal if practiced in the United States. They call these tactics 
'tradecraft,' and intelligence officers practice them in all the world's 
intelligence services.10
But can the goals of intelligence truly justify ruthless methods? No doubt 
Machiavelli, Cromwell, Lenin and others would concur. But it would be highly 
problematic to grant the profession of intelligence a kind of "strong moral role-
differentiation."" Of course, we do allow professionals to make certain ethical 
trade-offs. But professionals are mistaken if they consider their roles to render 
them immune to moral scrutiny. Physicians may not deceive patients into serving 
as unwitting subjects of medical experiments even though the knowledge derived 
from doing so will almost certainly benefit future patients. Soldiers may not maim 
or slaughter civilians in order to deter their compatriots from harboring guerrillas. 
Exceptions to prima facie ethical principles must be shown to fulfill more 
important principles, not simply be assumed to be acceptable due to their being 
professionally "expedient." An affirmation of the legitimacy of the CIA as an 
institution does not entail moral approval of every end it might pursue nor every 
method it might employ. 
What follows is an exploration of selected ethical problems arising in the 
work of intelligence officers. I cannot claim to possess the level of knowledge and 
wisdom requisite to resolving all of these issues satisfactorily, but perhaps my 
"spadework" will at least serve to stimulate further debate and reflection. 
VOLUNTARY AGENTS 
When US intelligence officers recruit agents in foreign countries, they may 
have very specific offensive or defensive goals, or they may wish simply to build 
"assets" — human sources of information and influence — for future use. Richard 
Bissell, CIA's Deputy Director for Plans from 1958 to 1962, testified before 
 Congress in 1975: "It was the normal practice in the Agency and an important part 
of its mission to create various kinds of capability long before there was any reason 
to be certain whether those would be used or where or how or for what purpose. The 
whole ongoing job of... a secret intelligence service of recruiting agents is of that 
character."12 Bissell did not estimate what proportion of CIA agents take on that role 
freely. But that is a matter of significant ethical import. 
Foreign citizens apparently become agents of the US Government for a wide 
variety of personal reasons: ethical concerns about their own governments: the lure 
of adventure, excitement and secrecy; desire for money; sexual and other blackmail; 
agents* resentment and frustration regarding their overt careers; or some combina-
tion of these factors.13
Some agents require little or no persuasion on the part of intelligence officers 
to engage in espionage on behalf of the US. Many agents are motivated by the sheer 
excitement of spying and the promise of steady extra income. But many others 
decide to engage in espionage out of deep-seated antagonism toward their native 
regimes.1'4 This was true, for example, of a number of high-ranking Soviet military 
and KGB officials who either passed sensitive documents to the CIA or who 
defected when they no longer in good conscience could remain loyal to the Soviet 
government. 
One such agent, a Soviet military intelligence officer named Pyotr Popov, 
supplied valuable information to CIA during the 1950s apparently out of repug-
nance toward the KGB's treatment of Russian peasants.I5 Another Soviet defector-
in-place, Oleg Penkovskiy, fearing that Khrushchev intended to launch a preemptive 
nuclear strike, provided US intelligence with thousands of pages of Soviet military 
documents, including information on Soviet nuclear weapon capabilities that 
proved vital to President Kennedy's actions during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.16 It 
is perhaps not too far-fetched to believe that in a state characterized by an 
oppressive political system, espionage intended to undermine that system's power 
and prestige can actually provide authentic hope to agents and dissident groups. 
Former CIA officer Harry Rositzke argued that although agents sent on missions 
against the Soviet Union in the late 1940s and early 1950s "knew from the beginning 
that the cards were stacked against them," they were nonetheless "highly 
motivated," having witnessed the effects of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, the 
Ukraine and the Baltic States.17
However, espionage against one's government is considered treason in 
every part of the world and, if exposed, frequently entails severe punishment for the 
agent. Both Popov and Penkovskiy (like the many agents betrayed by CIA officer 
Aldrich Ames18) were reportedly executed after their capture and interrogation by 
the KGB. Thus the fact that agents are volunteers does not thereby purge their CIA 
case officer of moral responsibility or liability. 
Although witting agents usually have no illusions about the consequences of 
capture, their covert sponsors may ask them to accomplish tasks entailing greater 
risk than those of which they are aware or would agree to accept. Rositzke described 
 how a nervous double agent was emboldened to meet with his KGB handler: CIA 
polygraphed the agent, but then showed him a different graph than his own to 
convince him that he could successfully withstand a KGB debriefing.19 Another 
agent was asked by US officials to organize "a small, tightly knit resistance group" 
of his military colleagues, but he refused out of fear of the KGB's wholesale 
infiltration of society. In fact, he wouldn't even provide CIA with the names of 
anyone who might be a Soviet dissident, fearing that a failed attempt by CIA to 
recruit any of them could easily "blow back" on him.20
A more recent case (1990) also illustrates the ominous consequences of agent 
exposure: 
Two or three undercover agents believed to be working for Israel in 
a Syrian-based terrorist group were unmasked and killed last fall, not 
long after the United States gave the Damascus Government informa-
tion about terrorist activities in the country . . .. 
Officials said the Administration argued that [Syrian President] 
Assad should be given an unusually detailed briefing about the actions 
of Syrian-based terrorists to impress upon him the weight of the 
evidence against his Government. Intelligence officials are said to 
have warned that such a briefing would put undercover agents and 
methods of gathering information at risk. 
'It was quite an argument,' said one official who has been informed 
of the debate. 'The intelligence guys finally told them, 'O.K., but the 
blood will be on your hands if something happens.'21
Agents working against tyrannical regimes or terrorist cells have a compelling 
ethical claim to have information about their clandestine activities very closely 
guarded by their CIA handlers. 
But some voluntary agents have apparently been regarded as "expendable."22 
James McCargar, a former operations officer, wrote that many American agents 
have been gratuitously slandered by the CIA upon their termination or "disposal" 
as agents, presumably to render them less credible should they attempt to publicize 
their former espionage work.23 Alternatively, an agent who had stopped producing 
useful intelligence might be intentionally exposed in order to humiliate the target 
country's counterintelligence personnel. This is especially tempting when the agent 
is a mole, since such a revelation would cause agents employed by the target country 
to worry that their own safety was endangered by leaks. The aftermath of the arrest 
of CIA officer Aldrich Ames as a Soviet/Russian mole is instructive in this regard.24
British journalist Tom Mangold learned through extensive research into the 
long tenure of James Angleton as CIA's head of counterintelligence that a number 
of bona fide Soviet defectors and other CIA agents were grossly mistreated—some 
even betrayed to the KGB — due to Angleton's unfortunate reliance on the bizarre, 
self-serving opinions of one particular Soviet defector, Anatoliy Golitsyn. To the 
Agency's credit, though, following Angleton's forced retirement it made efforts to 
 compensate some of the agents (and CIA officers) who had unjustly suffered as a 
result of Angleton's and Golitsyn's suspicions.25
The CIA has also been criticized for building up the hopes of agents beyond 
what the US Government really intended to support. According to McCargar, US 
intelligence developed a cooperative relationship with an unnamed Eastern 
European monarchist group, deceiving them into believing that the US intended 
to restore the monarchy in order to benefit from the "considerable intelligence" 
the group provided.26 In addition, historian John Ranelagh has accused the US of 
a "cold ruthlessness" in supporting partisans in postwar Ukraine and elsewhere 
when it had no intention to commit its military forces to save them from being 
annihilated.27
The culpability of US officials has been mitigated, however, in regard to 
certain covert operations in Poland, Albania and Cuba, where American long-term 
objectives were defeated by the compromise of its operations and communications 
by enemy intelligence. US officials were unaware, for example, that British 
intelligence officers Kim Philby and George Blake were actually Soviet agents who 
would succeed in betraying numerous espionage and covert action projects and 
cause the deaths of hundreds of Western agents.28 The temptation to exploit 
voluntary agents for purposes of Realpolitik must be considered as a plausible moral 
risk, though. One is reminded of the ways in which various governments have 
repeatedly inflated Kurdish nationalist hopes solely in order to place temporary 
pressure on Iran, Iraq or Syria, only later to abandon the Kurds out of expediency.29
DECEPTION AND COERCION 
When the CIA is unable to obtain voluntary agents, it sometimes "recruits" 
them, so to speak, through deception. In some cases, people who wouldn't willingly 
work for the CIA are made unwittingly to do exactly that by passing information to 
a trusted friend or associate who happens to be in CIA employ but who presents 
himself as one with loyalties more congenial to the person being duped.30 This 
method is sometimes called "false-flag" recruitment,31 since the recruiter 
misrepresents the country that he or she is representing. It's essentially a con 
game, wherein one first ascertains the potential agent's basic loyalties and core 
values in order to concoct a scheme to persuade him to provide sensitive 
information without upsetting his conscience or arousing his suspicions. 
Miles Copeland said that "[i]f the prospective agent hates Americans," for 
example, the recruiter "can tell him he is acting in behalf of the French — or the 
British... or some Senator or crusading newspaperman," whatever his conscience 
is assessed as most likely to tolerate.32 David Phillips, another former CIA officer, 
attested that "there are unsuspecting zealots around the world who are managed and 
paid as spies; they sell their countries' secrets believing all the while they are helping 
'the good guys.'"33
"False-flag" cases are odd from a moral perspective, since in one respect the 
agents willingly provide sensitive information, probably knowing that they would 
 be punished if their activities were exposed. But, of course, the voluntary nature of 
such action is only superficial, since if the agents knew to whom the information was 
actually being passed they most likely would not provide it. 
Two general types of coercive recruitment have been cited in the literature.34 
In some cases, knowledge of an agent's potentially embarrassing or patently illegal 
activities is used to extort espionage service. Prospective agents may be confronted 
with proof of their past crimes and blackmailed into working as spies in exchange 
for their covert employer keeping such evidence from their own country's police. 
As a former CIA officer indicated, in many instances the local police would already 
be aware of such crimes, but would cooperate with CIA in not referring them for 
prosecution.35 Since this method closely resembles that of the FBI in coercing 
criminals into becoming informers, it may be seen to be less objectionable than 
some other methods of agent recruitment. In cases where prospective agents' 
perpetration of crimes mitigates their right to be free from retributive coercion, the 
issue of their consent to becoming spies loses some of its force. But this cannot be 
said to provide a "blank check" to a secret recruiter to coerce a criminal to engage 
in espionage. (In addition, as I shall argue, there are ethical concerns regarding the 
agent's society which should not be ignored.) 
In other cases, though, embarrassing situations can be created for previously 
innocent potential agents, and the threat of exposure used to extort their compliance. 
One technique involves first establishing a seemingly natural friendship with a 
prospective agent, and gradually ''stretching" the person's conscience to the point 
of accepting tasks that he or she would previously have found unacceptable. Casual 
requests by the recruiter for seemingly innocuous data evolve subtly to more 
obviously illegal assignments, until the agent either makes a conscious decision to 
remain an informant, or continues out of fear of exposure.36
Those cultivating the spy will press favors upon him, without, in the 
initial stages, asking for anything in return. This is clearly a matter in 
which sensibilities must be catered to in order to avoid giving offense 
or having one's motives suspect. Reciprocity obliges most people to 
respond in kind; the trick is to escalate the exchange to the point where 
a more compromising engagement can be undertaken.37
Espionage activity that is initiated in a deceptive manner can thus at some point 
take on more obviously coercive characteristics. James Angleton reportedly 
described this method as "incremental entrapment in a subtle web of irresistible 
compromises."38
The degree to which CIA employs blatantly coercive methods in its agent 
recruitment and handling has actually been a topic of contention among former CIA 
officers. James McCargar said that since the case officer is dependent upon the 
actions of the agent, this naturally inhibits the degree to which an agent can be 
dominated: "To this extent every agent is a free agent." He also claimed that 
"compulsion is a very limited technique," since the agent thus "is in no frame of 
 mind to exploit his own skills or possibilities to the fullest."39 Arthur Jacobs 
similarly argued that "there is rarely to be found any effective means of exercising 
absolute control [over an agent], even by such lurid devices as blackmail, exposure 
of offensive relationships or personal habits of the source."40 Note that neither 
Jacobs nor McCargar implied that coercive methods would be morally objection-
able //"they were effective. 
If CIA officials indeed concluded that absolute control over an agent was 
impossible, this was not for lack of trying. For at least two decades the Agency 
funded experiments using mind-altering drugs, electroshock, hypnosis, sensor}' 
deprivation, and other techniques in an elusive quest to find foolproof ways to 
manipulate agents. Some of the motivation behind these efforts lay in fears that the 
Soviet Union and China had developed technical "brainwashing" methods that 
needed to be understood and countered by US intelligence. But sadly little 
consideration was given to the rights of the largely unwitting human subjects of CIA 
mind-control experiments.41
Even if agents cannot be completely "controlled" by their covert supervisors, 
we may infer that espionage agents are regarded by their sponsors primarily as 
means to the end of collecting intelligence. The full range of habits, beliefs, virtues 
and vices making up the character of an individual agent are to prudent espionage 
officers merely helps or hindrances to the production of useful intelligence for their 
superiors.42 Of course, instrumentalist relationships are common to a wide variety 
of human endeavors, such as business negotiations and contracts. But the element 
of crude manipulation that can apparently be present in espionage is what ought to 
elicit our heightened ethical scrutiny. 
E. Drexel Godfrey, Jr., former Director of Current Intelligence at CIA, 
strongly criticized CIA methods of recruiting agents, stating that CIA officers are 
"painstakingly trained in techniques that will convert an acquaintance into a 
submissive tool... shred away his resistance and deflate his sense of self-worth."43 
Miles Copeland, expressing a more sanguine view, claimed that CIA uses coercion 
in agent recruitment "only when there is a good chance of converting it into positive 
motivation": 
As quickly as possible, the principal [an intermediary between officer 
and agent] must enable the agent to deceive himself into believing that 
he would have become an agent even had he not been caught with his 
pants down, and that what he is doing is justifiable on its own merits.44
Moreover, Copeland said, the agent must be persuaded that the government 
employing him in espionage regards his safety as more important than any particular 
piece of information he might forward: 
Maintaining such an attitude might occasionally mean passing up 
some item of tremendous importance, but in the long run it pays off 
because it keeps the agent feeling safe and happy and maintains his 
productivity over a long period of years.45
 William Hood has written that an element of control is not simply desirable 
but imperative in agent recruitment: 
No espionage service can tolerate the merest whiff of independence 
or reserve on the part of an agent. . . .  With a new agent, the case 
officer's first task is to maneuver him into a position where there is 
nothing that he can hold back — not the slightest scrap of information 
nor the most intimate detail of his personal life. Until this level of 
control has been achieved, the spy cannot be said to have been fully 
recruited.46
James Angleton, Hood's former boss in counterintelligence, apparently held 
a similar view, according to Edward Epstein: 
Whereas money, sex, ideology, and ambition provide the means for 
compromising targets, the lever used to convert a man into a mole 
tends to be blackmail __Whatever lure is used, the point of the sting 
is to make it impossible for the recruit to explain his activities to his 
superiors. He is compromised, not so much by his original indiscre-
tion, but for failing to report it.47
(Note that Angleton here was referring to a special type of agent, the "mole" or 
penetration agent within an enemy's intelligence service. Not all espionage agents 
would be necessarily compromised by failing to report certain activities to their 
employer, but an intelligence officer would.) 
Another former CI A official. Howard Stone, admitted that CIA often recruits 
agents by bribery or blackmail. But, believing that such methods often produce 
unreliable agents who only pretend to have access to important information, he 
urged CIA instead "to win over prominent foreign officials of sound moral 
character."41* One former CIA officer who served many years in Latin America told 
me that none of his agent relations were based on blackmail or other coercion. He 
believed like Howard Stone that such methods invariably produced "servile" and 
unreliable agents who "don't exercise good judgment." But this officer went on to 
say, "[My agents] produced for me because they knew I was reliable and they could 
count on me in a pinch. They would and did risk their lives for me." He added, 
though, that different methods might be necessary in other countries where the 
stakes and pressures were greater, such as the Soviet Union or Cuba.49 It seems 
likely that a CIA officer having qualms about deceptive or coercive recruiting 
methods would simply not be assigned to such countries or would not remain there 
very long (at least in an agent-recruiting capacity). 
MANIPULATION 
Perhaps most troubling of the professional skills of an intelligence officer is 
the ability to manipulate persons. The degree of manipulation can vary from the 
subtle blackmail threat latent in a financial relationship with an espionage agent to 
more obviously coercive and even violent measures. The element of control in 
 intelligence operations is directly related to suspicion of the loyalty of the agent. 
Suspicion is a professional virtue for intelligence officers, especially for those who 
work in security and counterintelligence, since in theory anyone thought to be 
trustworthy may in fact be secretly serving the enemy. 
The practice of interrogation is a significant component of intelligence work, 
but also illustrates manipulation in its rawest form. William Johnson, a former CIA 
counterintelligence officer, has offered a glimpse of the ethical risks involved: 
Interrogation is such a dirty business that it should be done only by-
people of the cleanest character. Anyone with sadistic tendencies 
should not be in the business.50
We are reminded, though, of the ease with which ordinary people can come to 
rationalize callousness and cruelty in dealing with perceived enemies. Given the 
natural human capacity for aggression, combined with the right set of biases, 
incentives and peer pressures, many ordinarily decent people can succumb to 
sadism.'1 The line between interrogation and torture is perilously thin. 
What is it about interrogation that is "dirty"? To Johnson, it is not the 
presence of inflicted physical pain, which he regards to be not only morally dubious 
but counterproductive. 
[PJhysical pain is not relevant in interrogation. Anxiety, humiliation. 
loneliness, and pride are another story . . .. The person who enjoys 
hurting is a lousy interrogator in even the most human [humane?] 
situation. But the humane person who shrinks from manipulating his 
subject is also a lousy interrogator __ The interrogator, like a priest or 
doctor [!]. must have a talent for empathy, a personal need to commu-
nicate with other people, a concern for what makes other people tick 
even when he is putting maximum emotional pressure on them.52
In everyday moral parlance, empathy is related to compassion. But in 
intelligence work, the "other" is considered to be a potential threat to persons and 
interests that the intelligence officer is sworn to protect. "Knowing one's enemy'* 
in this role means understanding the "other,'* but not in the interest of enhancing 
their freedom or well-being: on the contrary, empathy becomes a manipulative 
tool.5- This altered meaning of empathy holds true beyond the practice of 
interrogation. It also characterizes a significant part of the professional skill 
involved in recruiting and handling agents, whose trust is often essential to gaining 
their control. 
COVERT ACTION 
Harry Rositzke argued that the kind of agent-manipulation that frequently 
occurs in espionage and counterespionage operations may not apply to some types 
of covert action. Covert financial support for political leaders or dissidents, for 
example, need not entail their coercion since it serves their interests.54 James 
McCargar expressed a similar opinion: 
 In a political operation the case officer must have arrived at a clear and 
workable accommodation of interests with the agent. Control by the 
case officer there must be, but not duplicity. The purposes of case 
officer and agent must have been presented with the maximum 
permissible clarity, and then a reconciliation of conflicts and limita-
tions negotiated. In brief, the outstanding characteristic of the 
political case officer-agent relationship is that it must be an alliance, 
not a utilization of the agent by the case officer, as often occurs in 
intelligence.55
But the fact that this state of affairs applied for a time to CIA relations with 
Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega,56 among others, indicates that these argu-
ments do not dispel moral concern for the wider context of covert action. Knowing 
that a covert action coincides with the interests of particular foreign nationals is not 
sufficient to justify it ethically, since covert action may involve the violation of 
rights that ought to override those interests. 
It is also likely that an intelligence officer would seek to "vet" (or test the 
authenticity of) an agent of covert influence against the evidence supplied by 
informers or espionage agents, hence the need to use some method of agent 
recruitment and handling having one or more of the attendant moral concerns 
previously identified. 
Now since the "product" of a covert action agent is in some respects "public" 
(unlike the product of an espionage agent), it is perhaps more difficult to deceive a 
covert action agent than an espionage agent as to the real intentions of his or her 
secret employers. One can more easily conceive, though, of a covert action agent 
(such as a newspaper reporter or editorialist) being coerced through blackmail or 
other threats into engaging in covert action. Such considerations provide further 
qualification, then, to Rositzke"s and McCargar*s assertions of the voluntary 
participation of covert action agents. 
Secret financial support for foreign political or labor leaders is morally 
complex. In some cases it can plausibly be considered a form of humanitarian 
intervention. For example, CIA aid to centrist political parties in postwar France, 
Italy and Japan helped to counter covert Soviet aid to communist parties there, while 
CIA assistance to Christian Democrats in El Salvador was intended to prevent an 
election victory by right-wing candidates tied to death squads. Almost certainly the 
political consequences in those countries would have been grave had no aid been 
provided by CIA. But often the efforts made by US officials to provide such aid 
openly have been insufficient.57 Covert political action has been employed despite 
the fact that foreign citizens would rightly suspect the objective judgment owed to 
them by their leaders to have been clouded by their acceptance of secret payments. 
Former CIA Director William Colby, who oversaw covert aid to anti-
communist politicians in Italy during the 1950s, claimed in his memoirs, "The 
program in Italy gave aid to the democratic forces to obtain their goals. It did not 
 'bribe' them to follow American direction . . .."58 But Colby exhibited a very 
different view when asked by journalist Oriana Fallaci,"... if I came [to the U.S.], 
as a foreigner, and financed an American party, and 21 of your politicians, and some 
of your journalists, what would you do?" Colby responded that he would report her 
to the FBI.59
We rightly condemn corporate purchasing agents who accept or extort lavish 
gifts from would-be suppliers, doctors who receive kickbacks from pharmaceutical 
companies for prescribing certain drugs, and legislators who seek political contri-
butions from industries they are supposed to regulate. Secret payments to foreign 
government leaders, even when made with good intentions, create at a minimum the 
appearance of a conflict of interest on the part of the recipient. They undermine 
government accountability and the public trust, and should be avoided. 
USE OF UNDERWORLD FIGURES 
Another significant area of ethical concern has to do with the obstruction of 
justice in sheltering criminals used as agents, as in. for example, the postwar 
recruitment by US intelligence of a number of Nazi war criminals to engage in 
espionage and covert operations against the Soviet Union.60 Christopher Simpson, 
a reporter who extensively researched this subject, quoted Harry RosStzke as 
explaining: 
It was a visceral business of using any bastard as long as he was anti-
Communist . . . [and] the eagerness or desire to enlist collaborators 
meant that sure, you didn't look at their credentials too closely.61
Simpson claimed, however, that US intelligence did indeed know about the war 
crimes "credentials" of many of its postwar recruits, as did the British. French and 
Soviets, who also employed suspected and proven war criminals in intelligence 
roles.6: He also showed that this practice became risky to US intelligence as well, 
when ex-Nazis threatened to publicize American covert operations in which they 
had participated unless the US helped them to escape abroad to avoid prosecution 
for their wartime atrocities.63
The CIA later involved similarly shady characters in plots to assassinate 
various foreign leaders. Underworld figures like Sam Giancana and Santos 
Trafficante were approached to kill Fidel Castro.64 Another individual recruited to 
kill an African politician was described in an internal CIA memo in the following 
fashion: 
He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given 
an assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, 
but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then 
it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its 
execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize 
all actions.65
 The Senate committee that investigated the assassination plots appropriately 
judged this type of rationalization to be "not in keeping with the ideals of our 
nation." The committee also observed that employing underworld characters 
"gives them the power to blackmail the government and to avoid prosecution, for 
past or future crimes."66
In hindsight at least, it seems obvious that espionage and covert actions 
relying upon criminals as intelligence "assets** bear a strong burden of moral 
justification, chiefly since the victims of their crimes cannot be assumed to give tacit 
consent to their shelter from prosecution, but also because they can pose a threat to 
the societies in which they are secretly sheltered. Furthermore, in cases where 
perpetrators of mass murder (or even "ordinary" murder) have sought refuge in 
intelligence work, it is difficult to see how the practice could be justified at all, even 
under the pressures that CIA officers felt in the early postwar years to quickly 
develop an underground network in the event of war with the Soviet Union.67
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE 
Recognition of the sometimes grave consequences of espionage and covert 
action at least ought to have a sobering effect on the consideration of the ends they 
are intended to serve. If national security can possibly justify deceptive and 
coercive intelligence methods, it is far from clear that lesser ends can. 
To illustrate, no American corporation today could or should hope to achieve 
the influence that the United Fruit Company had on US policy toward Guatemala 
in the early 1950s. Before Allen Dulles became CIA Director under Eisenhower, 
he worked for a powerful law firm that arranged profitable deals for United Fruit in 
Guatemala, where it owned extensive plantations and rail lines and regularly 
crushed incipient labor unions. Thus, when the company asked the CIA to 
overthrow the country's first elected president, its request fell on eager and familiar 
ears. Allen Dulles even promised the company that whoever CIA selected to be the 
next Guatemalan leader would not be allowed to nationalize or in any way disrupt 
the company's operations.68 The interests and objectives of particular corporations 
are not necessarily identical to those of the United States, yet this perspective was 
lost on many US officials during the Cold War. The same people whose prescience 
enabled the US to meet the many real challenges posed by the Soviet Union and its 
allies were nonetheless capable of rationalizing the corruption of national ends to 
serve a scandalously small elite. 
The breakup of the Soviet Union has not only resulted in large cuts in US 
defense spending, but has also caused the CIA's overall mission and budget to be 
carefully scrutinized. Many people are asking whether CIA resources should now 
be focused in ways that more directly enhance American economic 
competitiveness. Some members of Congress and business leaders have called 
upon the CIA to spy on behalf of American corporations, much as the governments 
of France and Japan are doing for their native companies. Unless US firms are 
able to "fight fire 
 with fire," the argument goes, they will be at a decided disadvantage in the global 
market/9
Fortunately, many large American corporations have said that they neither 
want nor need this sort of help from the Agency, and CIA officials have lobbied 
against it as well. Former CIA Director Robert Gates said in an oft-quoted April 
1992 speech: 
[US intelligence] does not, should not, and will not engage in 
industrial espionage . . .. Plainly put, it is the role of U.S. business 
to size up their foreign competitors' trade secrets, marketing strat-
egies, and bid proposals. Some years ago, one of our clandestine 
service officers said to me: 'You know, I'm prepared to give my life 
for my country, but not for a company.' That case officer was 
absolutely right.70
The moral justification of espionage (let alone covert action) is highly dubious in 
the service of preserving or enhancing the global competitiveness of US corpora-
tions. Apart from the defense industry, which is uniquely tied to US national 
security, the reasons that American companies might offer to persuade the CIA to 
spy for them almost certainly could not be weighty enough to override the rights of 
foreign citizens duped or coerced into committing espionage. Nor would voluntary 
agents incurring great risks to deliver secret intelligence to the CIA be amused to 
learn that their reports were being forwarded to US corporations to enable them to 
tap previously untouched consumer markets or to gain an edge over their foreign 
competitors. Even if it were possible to "sanitize" this data in ways that did not 
jeopardize intelligence sources and methods, questions of fairness would still arise. 
For example, which American companies would be given that information? Should it 
be free (i.e., subsidized by taxpayers), or should companies pay for it? 
On the other hand, the current practice of the US Government of providing 
counterintelligence advice to American companies overseas (e.g., how to prevent 
company phones from being tapped) is in most cases morally acceptable. Such 
assistance has in fact been provided for many years through the State Department's 
Overseas Security Advisor)' Council. 
ASSASSINATION 
That the CIA developed the capability to disable and assassinate foreign 
leaders is not in dispute, though precisely when that capability was conceived is 
unclear. The record indicates that an internal CIA ''Health Alteration Committee" 
existed as early as 1960, and that a CIA "executive action" capability, which 
included assassination, was authorized by the White House as early as 1961.71 
However, since OSS had developed drugs during WWII for the purpose of 
assassinating and incapacitating Nazi leaders,72 it is entirely possible that CIA 
inherited this capability and maintained it from its inception. Some evidence 
exists to suggest that CIA was authorized to create a special squad in 1949 whose 
 duties included kidnapping and assassination, though primarily of suspected 
double agents.73
As John Marks has detailed. CIA technicians developed drugs and stockpiled 
bacteriological toxins that could immobilize an individual for hours, days or 
months, or kill in a manner that could not be ascertained by autopsy or that appeared 
to be the result of a deadly disease that the individual might plausibly have 
contracted naturally.74
Assassination has been prohibited by US executive orders since the mid-
1970s, but there are indications that it may have been authorized since that time 
at high levels within the US Government. A manual developed for the Nicaraguan 
contras by one or more of their CIA advisers, for example, urged that Sandinista 
officials be "neutralized"' as part of a "selective use of violence for propaganda 
purposes."75 In addition, former CIA general counsel Stanley Sporkin reportedly 
concluded in the early 1980s that violent actions taken against terrorists would not 
constitute assassination under US law,76 and this opinion may have served as the 
justification for "sensitive retaliation operations" launched against those believed 
responsible for the 1983 bombings of the US Embassy and Marine compound in 
Beirut.77
Neil Livingstone, an expert on terrorism and low-intensity conflict, argues 
that "state-sanctioned terminations** can be justified against terrorists: 
Just as it is not a crime to kill the enemy during wartime, so too should 
it not be regarded as a crime or a morally reprehensible act when a 
nation, acting in concert with its obligation to protect its own citizens 
from harm, seeks out and destroys terrorists outside its borders who 
have committed, or are planning to commit atrocities on its territory 
or against its citizens.7" 
Uivingstone adds, however, that assassination should be considered "only 
when the potential target cannot be brought to justice in a more conventional 
manner."79 His caveat is an important one, in part because assassination by 
definition excludes due process of law in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the 
"accused** as well as in applying an appropriate punishment if and when guilt is 
established. The assassin in effect acts as prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner 
combined; the target is precluded from being represented by counsel before an 
impartial court. These concerns suggest that assassination ought only to be used as 
a last resort.80
Other writers have favored the assassination of foreign government leaders 
in particular circumstances. Angelo Codevilla questions the sensibility of the US 
legal prohibition of assassination, suggesting that the practice is morally preferable 
to accepting the consequences of aggressive war: 
The military art, the very opposite of indiscriminate killing, consists 
of striking those people and things most likely to stop the enemy from 
continuing the war. Today, the specialization of weapons and tactics 
 of war make it easier than ever to go after those whose death is most 
likely to stop the killing. Often, as in the Gulf War [ 1990-91 ], there 
is no quarrel with the enemy country, only with its chief. In such cases. 
it is both futile and immoral to demolish a country in the hope that this 
will persuade the tyrant to give way. Why not kill the tyrant?81
Codevilla's assertion that it is unwise to prohibit assassination tout court is 
supported by numerous arguments in the Western philosophical tradition justifying 
tyrannicide as a permissible (if last-resort) means to a just end. But missing from 
Codevilla's argument are other considerations present in the tradition that weigh 
against employing assassination as an isolated act. One important concern is that 
unless tyrannicide is coupled with a wider effort to replace the entire regime, it will 
likely result in greater repression of the populace rather than less.8: Many of the CIA 
assassination plots investigated by the US Congress in 1975 seemed to belie any real 
consideration for the well-being of their intended victim's fellow citizens. Too 
often the death of a foreign leader was an end in itself rather than simply a possible 
outcome of a comprehensive effort to replace a bad government with one that 
respected human rights. Removing Fidel Castro, for example, would not by itself 
have diminished the Cuban regime's oppression of its citizens, yet numerous CIA 
plots were devised against Castro (with vigorous White House support, to be sure) 
without any coordinated plan to replace him with a viable and more liberal 
government.83
Assassination is often thought to be capable of ending and preventing war 
and terrorist crimes. No doubt this is true in many cases. But like other forms of 
covert action, assassination has too often been proposed as an option well before 
other less morally objectionable measures have been tried. For example, among the 
covert operations considered by CIA in 1954 against President Arbenz of Guate-
mala was his assassination by means of a "silent bullet." It is a disturbing 
commentary on the quality of moral reasoning employed by CIA and other senior 
US officials at that time that the only apparent reason why the assassination option 
was discarded was a desire not to make Arbenz a martyr.84
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 
The late Paul Seabury once said: "The exercise of power does not necessarily 
corrupt, The craft of intelligence can have as its practitioners those who were able 
to maintain their integrity while being liars and obfuscators."85 I do not doubt the 
essential truth of that provocative thought. The United States must be able to depend 
upon its intelligence officers to be persons of high ethical standards. 
But personal integrity can easily be undermined by the wrong kinds of 
incentives and pressures, and must therefore be cultivated, monitored and rein-
forced institutionally. Those who have the authority to establish objectives for 
intelligence operations must not only weigh the ethical justification of those ends 
but must also raise ethical questions about the various means being considered to 
 achieve them. Intelligence officers in the field, in turn, must be trained' to recognize 
ethical issues as such, and must be allowed to communicate their concerns to their 
supervisors without fear for their careers. 
To some extent, the CIA already addresses ethical concerns in its internal 
training and communications. Hulnick and Mattausch claimed that honesty must 
apply to internal CIA communications and practices. Intelligence judgments must 
never be altered "to fit the desires of policymakers who might prefer different 
conclusions."'*6 and intelligence officers '"must be scrupulous in managing funds or 
equipment with which they are entrusted.'" given the fact that many funds are not 
subject to outside audit and that certain equipment is designed to prevent its being 
identified with CIA.87 They also noted an interesting implication of the oath of 
secrecy which intelligence officers must swear. Like military personnel, they 
cannot appeal to a "Nuremberg defense'" in the face of a clearly improper order from 
a superior. But unlike other public servants, they do not have the option of "going 
public" with an issue or order they consider to be illegal or immoral if the internal 
"whistleblowing" procedure proves to be unsatisfactory to them: "public discus-
sion is not possible without a gross violation of classification rules and the 
professional ethics of the intelligence officer."88
In January 1992. James Barry, then Director of the CIA's Center for the 
Study of Intelligence, responded to a series of questions I had submitted with an 
interesting letter cleared by higher officials for release. Arguing that "[professional 
ethics is a central component of [CIA's] training and career development process," 
Barry described in general terms the kinds of training provided for new CIA 
employees, mid-career employees, new supervisors and middle managers, and 
senior officials. He stated that high ethical standards play an important role in the 
evaluation and certification of case officers, and that those individuals receive 
specialized, tutorial training in ethical issues related to foreign intelligence, coun-
terintelligence and covert action. Barry further noted CIA's standing policy that any 
employees having ethical concerns "may report them in confidence to the [CIA] 
Inspector General."89
There is further indication that CI A has maintained a form of "conscientious 
objector" status for its personnel relative to certain morally problematic assign-
ments. Testimony of former CIA officers before the Senate committee investigat-
ing assassination plots in 1975 suggests that CIA employees were allowed to decline 
to participate in those plots without experiencing threats to their career. "Michael 
Mulroney" (pseud.), a former CIA officer, testified that in 1960 he refused on moral 
grounds to carry out a political assassination requested by the head of CIA's 
clandestine division. Richard Bissell. and that his decision was supported by 
Bissell's deputy, Richard Helms.90 In addition, during the Vietnam War, American 
personnel involved with the Phoenix program were apparently granted a similar 
"conscientious objector" option.91
 CONCLUSIONS 
Although space does not permit review of all of the issues examined in this 
essay, some concluding reflections on selected categories of intelligence operations 
are warranted. The use of secret agents — voluntary and non-voluntary — is 
intended to provide valuable information believed to be unobtainable through 
methods overt or technical. The risks inherent in all espionage activities suggest, 
though, that for the sake of the agent alone, efforts should be made to determine 
before the agent is recruited that the information needed cannot in fact be ascer-
tained by less problematic methods. In addition, since after an agent is recruited the 
agent-officer relationship takes on a life and momentum of its own, care must be 
taken to avoid situations where innocent third parties would be harmed or justice 
obstructed in the interest of preserving the agent's identity and continued service. 
Recruiting voluntary agents has the advantage of involving no deception 
about the identity and general motives of the recruiter. Furthermore, a just cause can 
be served by intelligence officers and voluntary agents working together to 
undermine an unjust regime. But such agents deserve not to be deceived about the 
risks involved in the operations they are asked to carry out. Nor should the fact that 
their work is secret tempt their handlers to treat them as expendable, to allow them 
callously to be sacrificed to Realpolitik or the shifting winds of diplomacy. 
The chief advantage of employing a false-flag approach or blackmail in 
certain situations is that a just cause can be pursued even where foreign citizens are 
highly unlikely to serve voluntarily as CIA agents. But such methods raise very 
difficult questions. False-flag methods deceive the agent as to the identity of the 
recruiter, and thus hide from the agent the full risks inherent in his or her tasks as 
well as their true purposes. Blackmail is blatant coercion. It is difficult enough to 
justify its use against known criminals; all the more so when it arises out of the 
calculated entrapment of a previously innocent person who merely happens to have 
probable access to sensitive information desired by the CIA. Finally, to the extent 
that recruitment tactics seek to "stretch" the agent's conscience, they can result in 
the corruption of the agent in addition to his or her victimization. Deception and 
coercion in agent recruitment should certainly not be used as routine methods of 
obtaining "assets" whose future value as sources of vital intelligence is dubious. It 
is also important in light of Richard Bissell's 1975 testimony about recruiting agents 
"long before there [is] any reason to be certain whether those would be used or where 
or how or for what purpose."92
These concerns about espionage are challenged, though, by the claim that if 
one rules out an espionage source or method one may thereby eliminate the 
possibility of knowing certain kinds of vital information. It's not difficult to 
construct hypothetical cases in which knowing the intentions of a tyrannical regime 
or a terrorist cell could mean the difference between life and death for many people, 
cases which would therefore question the validity of strict prohibitions on deceptive 
and coercive intelligence methods or the use of criminals as agents. 
In addition, if we imagine a prospective agent who works in a sensitive 
capacity for the government of a manifestly tyrannical state, there is a sense in 
which, since that government itself is not and cannot be rationally willed by its 
oppressed citizens, neither can service to that government in ways that maintain its 
tyrannical nature be justified. Some regimes simply do not deserve the loyalty of 
their citizens. But given the fact that opportunities to persuade citizens and 
government officials in tyrannical states that they ought to commit treason are 
sometimes quite limited, the justification of coerced recruitment of agents to 
achieve this becomes more plausible, in spite of the fact that unless the tyranny poses 
a dire threat to other countries, coercive recruitment would appear to be a form of 
paternalistic intervention. Coercive recruitment of agents within a tyrannical state 
may become even more acceptable as that state's threat to other countries becomes 
more grave or imminent. Remembering Sissela Bok's assertion that "whenever it 
is right to resist an assault by force, it must then be allowable to do so by guile,"93 
espionage and covert action can serve as effective ways to prevent a tyranny from 
launching an aggressive war or intimidating its neighbors. 
Of course, to say that a decision or action is morally right does not necessarily 
mean that the outcome is unequivocally good. It may be, for example, that coercive 
recruitment of an agent can be morally justified in a particular situation, given the 
dire consequences of not having the information he or she can provide, say, plus a 
lack of morally acceptable alternatives. But since coercion involves an infringe-
ment of the agent's freedom (and conceivably other basic rights), the external good 
that may result from the recruitment cannot do away with the fact that the agent — 
a human being with emotions, hopes, and dreams, not merely an abstract "source," 
"asset," or "penetration" — suffers real harm in the process. 
Tragic choices are inevitable to some degree in intelligence work. The 
challenge, then, is to specify intelligence goals and manage operations in ways that 
recognize the myriad ethical issues at stake, in order to minimize the occurrence of 
avoidable tragedy. 
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